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We study a standard two period economy with one nominal bond and one ￿rm. The
input of the ￿rm is done in the ￿rst period and ￿nanced with the nominal bond, and its
pro￿ts are distributed to the shareholders in the second period. We show that a sunspot
equilibrium exists around each e¢ cient equilibrium. The interest rate is lower than optimal
and there is over production in sunspot equilibria, under some conditions. But a sunspot
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11 Introduction
We consider a simple two period private ownership economy with production. There is a single
perishable good in each period, traded competitively in each period. There is a nominal bond
market in the ￿rst period. There is one ￿rm which uses the ￿rst period good as input and produces
the second period good. Since the revenue is earned in the second period, the ￿rm needs to issue
the bond for purchasing its input in the good market in the ￿rst period. The households are
risk averse, and the technology is convex, so no economic agent favors randomness per se. The
purpose of this paper is to analyze the properties of sunspot equilibria of this economy.
Recall that sunspots are theoretical device to model random phenomena which do not a⁄ect
tastes, endowments of goods and resources, and production technology, within the framework of
rational expectations.1 Such phenomena include for instance price uncertainty, fear of in￿ ation,
animal spirits of investors, and the psychology of the markets in general. Under the standard con-
vexity assumptions, a sunspot equilibrium is Pareto ine¢ cient. So in other words, we investigate
if and how rational animal spirits cause ine¢ ciency in a production economy.
The existence and the real indeterminacy of sunspot equilibria in pure exchange economies
have been investigated extensively.2 But the production economy has not been studied system-
atically in this context to the best of our knowledge. Introducing production in an incomplete
market setting is known to be a challenge, because the objective of the ￿rm is not clearly de￿ned
in some cases. In this paper, we do not try to resolve how this issue should be addressed: instead,
we postulate that the ￿rm maximizes the expected pro￿ts. Although no formal justi￿cation is
given, the expected pro￿t maximization appears at least very plausible in the simple setup we
study.
Given the postulate, many insights from the case of pure exchange are then valid in the
production economy as well, and we shall take advantage of them as much as possible in this
paper. After providing a formal description of the model and the de￿nition of sunspot equilibria in
Section 2, we study the existence problem in Section 3. We shall show that a sunspot equilibrium
exists, with only very non-generic exceptions. The idea is very similar to that for the exchange
economy with a nominal bond. Since the market clearing of the bond market is enough to
establish the general equilibrium of the markets, one can arbitrarily ￿x the real values of nominal
returns depending on the sunspot states, and let the bond price adjust to clear the market.
Except for some knife edge cases, the resulting consumption will be random, and we have a
sunspot equilibrium.
A sunspot equilibrium is Pareto ine¢ cient, and there are two sources for the ine¢ ciency. The
1See the seminal paper Cass and Shell (1983).
2See Cass (1992) for a short overview. See also Gotardi and Kajii (1999), where a real asset instead of a
nominal bond is considered.
2￿rst is distributional ine¢ ciency, which is the focus of the pure exchange models: in e⁄ect, house-
holds consume according to an extrinsic lottery in the second period, which is welfare worsening.
The second is production ine¢ ciency, which cannot be addressed in the pure exchange models,
obviously: the ￿rm may be producing too much or too little in a sunspot equilibrium. Section
4 is devoted to the question of production ine¢ ciency, which is the main part of this paper.
We establish a characterization result (Proposition 1) which identi￿es exactly when over/under
production occurs in sunspot equilibria around e¢ cient equilibria. As is often the case in gen-
eral equilibrium analyses, the standard set of assumptions which guarantees the existence of an
equilibrium is not strong enough to tell if either over production or under production is to take
place. We argue nevertheless that in usual settings, a sunspot equilibrium tends to exhibit over
production: in a sunspot equilibrium, the price of bond is too high, i.e., the rate of interest
is too low, so that the ￿rm produces too much. That is, rational animal spirits tend to cause
overproduction.
In Section 5, we extend the model by introducing a market for the pro￿t share of the ￿rm. Of
course, if sunspots do not matter, trading pro￿t share is redundant since the price of the share
must be determined in such a way that the bond and the share are equivalent as assets. But
in a sunspot equilibrium, this equivalence might break down and so introduction of the pro￿t
share market could generate a di⁄erent kind of sunspot equilibrium. Interestingly enough, in this
extended set up, we show in Proposition 3 that there is no sunspot equilibrium.3 So if there is a
market for pro￿t share, there is no sunspot equilibrium and the pro￿t share market is redundant
and unnecessary in any equilibrium, but there are sunspot equilibria without it.4
Section 6 contains discussions on a few issues. First we comment on the issue of welfare gains
and losses: although a sunspot equilibrium is ine¢ cient, there might be some households who
are better o⁄ in the sunspot equilibrium than in an e¢ cient equilibrium.5 Next, we provide a
comparison with models with background income risks, which yield results with a ￿ avor similar
to ours. Finally, we give some remarks on extending our model to allow more than one good in
each period and multiple ￿rms.
2 The Model
We consider a standard competitive two-period economy with production. There is one perishable
consumption good in each period. There is one ￿rm with an increasing and concave production
function f with f (0) = 0; the ￿rm produces f (z) units of good in the second period (period
3The argument is a slight modi￿cation of the ingenious idea of Mas-Colell (1992).
4There are other cases where the existence of some markets makes the economy immune to sunspots, but those
markets are redundant in equilibria. In a pure exchange setup, Kajii (1997) shows that if there are an enough
number of ￿nancial options there is no sunspot equilibrium and the options are all redundant.
5Goenka, A. and PrØchac (2006) and Kajii (2007) investigate this issue for exchange economies.
31) from z units of good in the ￿rst period (period 0). There are H ￿ 2 households, labelled by
h = 1;2;:::H. Household h is endowed with e0
h units of good in period 0 and e1
h units in period







In the ￿rst period, period 0, a nominal bond which pays o⁄ one unit in units of account (say,
dollar) in the second period is traded in a competitive market. The bond price in units of the
period 0 good is denoted by q > 0. The ￿rm will ￿nance its input by issuing bond, which will be
held by households. Write B for the amount of bond issued by the ￿rm, and zh for the amount
held by household h. So the ￿rm raises qB in units of good in period 0, which is used as input.
Consequently, it produces f (qB) units of good in period 1 and is liable for the outstanding bond
issued, B dollars.
The real returns of the nominal bond will be determined in the markets, which might be
random; the households expect that the price of good in dollars might be random, and then
consequently the real value of bond￿ s payo⁄ is expected to be a random variable. In other words,
the households expect in￿ ation, and the rate of in￿ ation may vary according to the state of the
economy. This idea is formally described using sunspots as follows.
At the beginning of the second period, the state of economy is revealed. State s; s = 1;:::;S
occurs with probability ￿s > 0. We assume that these are sunspot states. That is, by assump-
tion, the state is publicly observable, and the fundamentals of the economy described so far are
independent of the realization of the sunspot state. It is often convenient to refer to the ￿rst
period (period 0) as state s = 0, and we shall follow this convention throughout the paper.
Write ps > 0 for the price of good in dollars when state s is realized. Then rs := 1
ps is the
real value of one dollar in state s. By construction, the real payo⁄ of the bond per unit is also rs
in state s, so we shall refer to rs as the (gross) return of the bond in state s. Since only relative
prices matters, we will always set
PS
s=1 ￿srs = 1 without loss of generality, i.e., we normalize
the prices so that the expected real payo⁄s of the bond in units of the period 1 good is one. We




+ for the vector of returns.
Sunspots do not in￿ uence production, but nevertheless, since the real returns of bond may
be random, the level of pro￿ts depends on sunspots in general. Speci￿cally, the realized pro￿t
is ￿s := f (qB) ￿ rsB in state s; in units of good, which will be distributed to the households
according the the pro￿t share ￿h; h = 1;:::;H. We assume that the ￿rm maximizes expected
pro￿ts; since
PS
s=1 ￿s = 1 and we normalize
PS
s=1 ￿srs = 1, this means that the ￿rm takes bond
price q as given and solves the following problem:
max
B￿0
f (qB) ￿ B; (1)
which is a well de￿ned concave problem under our assumptions.
Notice that the ￿rm￿ s optimal decision as well as the maximized level of pro￿t is independent
of ~ r. Let ￿￿ (q) be the maximum pro￿t given price q, and B￿ (q) be the set of pro￿t maximizers.
4That is, the ￿rm will choose B 2 B￿ (q) given bond price q. Then by construction the expected
pro￿t is ￿￿ (q) = f (qB) ￿ B and the level of pro￿ts in state s is ￿￿ (q) + (1 ￿ rs)B, s = 1;:::;S.
Note that although the expected pro￿t must be non-negative since zero production is feasible,
ex post pro￿t ￿s may be negative for some s. Also notice that the choice of B 2 B￿ (q) is
indeterminate as far as the expected pro￿t is concerned, but it does a⁄ect the randomness of
pro￿ts in principle.6 When f is strictly concave in the sense of f00 < 0 everywhere, B￿ (q) is
singleton and in such a case we shall abuse notation to denote the single element by B￿ (q) as
well. Note that B￿ (q) is increasing in q.
For household h holding zh units of the bond at the end of period 0, rszh units of consumption
good is delivered at the beginning of period 1 in state s. Also, household h receives ￿h￿s for
pro￿t share, thus the consumption of household h is e0
h ￿ qzh in period 0 and e1
h + rszh + ￿h￿s
in state s in period 1. Recall that ￿s < 0 is possible and so household h may be forced to
compensate for ￿rm￿ s loss; i.e., the liability of equity is unlimited. Also zh may be negative, i.e.,
household h may choose to borrow.
By assumption, the households take random pro￿ts ~ ￿ as given, as well as the other price
parameters. Rational expectations then require that random pro￿ts are given by an accounting
identity ~ ￿ = ￿￿ (q) + (1 ￿ ~ r)B. Since we focus on rational expectations, we assume that the
households take the bond supply B and pro￿t function ￿￿ as given. Taking this into account,
the second period consumption can be written in di⁄erent ways as follows:
e1
h + ~ rzh + ￿h~ ￿ = e1
h + ￿h (￿￿ (q) + B) + ~ r(zh ￿ ￿hB) (2)
= e1
h + ￿h￿￿ (q) + ~ rzh + (1 ￿ ~ r)￿hB: (3)
The preferences of household h are represented by a von Neumann Morgenstern utility func-
tion uh : R2





s=1 ￿srs = 1; and a pro￿le of pro￿ts ~ ￿ := (￿s)
S
s=1 2 RS, if household h chooses zh such that
consumption is positive, i.e., e0
h ￿ qzh > 0 and e1
h + rszh + ￿h￿s > 0 for every s = 1;:::;S, the







h + rszh + ￿h￿s￿
: (4)
Using the expectation operator E with respect to probability measure (￿s)
S
s=1, and denoting with
a slight abuse of notation by ~ r and ~ ￿ the random returns and pro￿ts, respectively, the utility
6For instance, some shareholders may prefer smaller B for less randomness in pro￿ts, but the others may not.
Then the shareholders might disagree on the choice among B in B￿ (q). Moerover, since some shareholders might
even prefer lower expected pro￿ts if randomness is reduced, the expected pro￿t maximization might not be the
shareholders￿interests. This is a potentially interesting question, but we do not pursue it in this paper.







h + ~ rzh + ￿h~ ￿
￿i
: (5)
Household h￿ s problem is to choose zh 2 R to maximize the expected utility (4).
Note that both random returns and random pro￿ts contribute to the randomness of income
in the second period. But recall the property of the second period consumption (2). We can








h + ￿h (￿￿ (q) + B) + ~ r(zh ￿ ￿hB)
￿￿
: (6)
From this expression we see that, other things being equal, the utility is sensitive to a small
change in random returns ~ r, unless zh = ￿hB.
It is assumed that uh is C3, di⁄erentiably strictly increasing (i.e., for any xh 2 R2
++, the
gradient Duh (xh) is strictly positive), di⁄erentiably strictly concave (i.e., for any xh 2 R2
++,
the Hessian D2uh(xh) is negative de￿nite), and for each level set, its closure in R2 is contained
in R2
++. The assumption of thrice di⁄erentiability is needed since the second derivatives of
demand functions are important in our analysis in Section 4. But the reader will see that the
di⁄erentiability assumption is not essential for the existence problem in Section 3 and for the
non-exsitence result in Section 5.
Under these assumptions, the function (4) is concave in zh and the optimal choice is charac-























@x1uh are derivatives with respect to the ￿rst period consumption and the
second period consumption, respectively. Using the expectation operator, and taking the property






















h + ￿h (￿￿ (q) + B) + ~ r(zh ￿ ￿hB)
￿
:
The solution to (7) is unique if it exists by the strict concavity of the utility function. The
existence depends on the returns ~ r among others, but since our analysis will be done locally
around a competitive equilibrium where the optimal choice is well de￿ned, we will simply assume
that a solution exists in the relevant domain of the analysis. Denote by Zh (q; ~ r;B) the unique
solution to (7); that is, Zh (q; ~ r;B) is the demand for bond of household h given prices q and ~ r
and the bond supply B of the ￿rm. Then Z (q; ~ r;B) :=
PH
h=1 Zh (q; ~ r;B) is the total demand
6for the bond of the households. It may ￿rst appear unusual that the demand function depends
on ￿rm￿ s choice variable B in addition to prices, but as we have explained above, there is no loss
as far as rational expectation equilibria are concerned. Note that since the bond supply function
B￿ (q) is a function of q; and so Z (q; ~ r;B) is e⁄ectively just a function of price variables (q; ~ r).
The prices endogenously determined in the markets are q and ~ r. Thus the rational expectation
equilibrium of this economy is de￿ned as follows:
De￿nition 1 A bond price q and a vector of returns ~ r = (￿￿￿ ;rs;￿￿￿) 2 RS with
PS
s=1 ￿srs = 1
constitute a competitive equilibrium if there exists B 2 B￿ (q) such that Z (q; ~ r;B) ￿ B = 0. A
competitive equilibrium is called a sunspot equilibrium if the second period consumption is not
constant across the states for some household.
Remark 2 Consider the case where the technology is strictly convex and so the supply B￿ (q)
is a singleton for any q. Denoting the unique element by B￿ (q) by convention, the equilibrium
condition above can be written as Z (q; ~ r;B￿ (q)) ￿ B￿ (q) = 0.
Remark 3 From the property of the second period consumption (2), it readily follows that an
equilibrium (q; ~ r) is a sunspot equilibrium if and only if there is some h such that Zh (q; ~ r;B) 6=
￿hB where B is the corresponding equilibrium bond supply.
The equilibrium condition above says that the bond market clears. As is usually the case, it
can be readily shown that if the bond markets clear, all the good markets clear.
When S = 1; our model is a standard two period model of consumption and saving, and so
an equilibrium exists and every equilibrium is Pareto e¢ cient. An equilibrium for the case of
S = 1 is called a certainty equilibrium. Under our normalization, the real return of bond is one
in any certainty equilibrium.




is an equilibrium for
any S > 1, where ~ 1 = (1;:::;1) 2 RS
+. This is an equilibrium where the households think that the
sunspot states do not a⁄ect the real returns of bond; that is, they expect that the return of bond
in units of good is one for sure. Such an equilibrium is called a non-sunspot equilibrium when
S > 1. By the fundamental theorem of welfare economics applied to the certainty equilibrium
and the risk aversion of households, a non-sunspot equilibrium is Pareto e¢ cient. From now on,
we assume that S > 1 to avoid triviality.
Conversely, since there is no uncertainty in production and so the aggregate consumption is
independent of sunspots, the risk aversion of the households and the convexity of the technology
imply that in any Pareto e¢ cient allocation, the consumption of each household must be inde-
pendent of sunspots. Hence in particular a sunspot equilibrium is ine¢ cient. But an e¢ cient
equilibrium may not be a non-sunspot equilibrium: it is possible that although the equilibrium
7returns ~ r are random, the households use the bond to completely o⁄set income risks generated
by random pro￿ts, as will be seen in Example 4.
3 Existence of sunspot equilibria
We argue that a sunspot equilibrium exists. The intuition for the existence is simple. Basically
in this model there are S price variables: bond price q and returns r1;:::;rS, but one degree
of freedom is lost by normalization. On the other hand, there is one market, the bond market,
which needs to be cleared, since the rest of the markets clear automatically if the bond market
clears. So even if the returns ~ r are arbitrarily ￿xed, the bond price q can be adjusted to clear the
market. But if ~ r 6= ~ 1, the income will be random and so will the consumption, except for some
coincidental cases. Formally, we have the following existence result.
Lemma 1 Let (￿ q;1) be a certainty equilibrium, and denote by ￿ zh the bond holding of household
h and by ￿ B the bond issued in the equilibrium. Then (1) there exists " > 0 such that for any
normalized returns ~ r with j~ r ￿ 1j < ", there is a bond price q such that (q; ~ r) is an equilibrium.
(2) Moreover, if ￿ zh ￿ ￿h ￿ B 6= 0 for some h, then there exists " > 0 such that for any normalized
returns ~ r with j~ r ￿ 1j < ", there is a bond price q such that (q; ~ r) is a sunspot equilibrium.
This result can be shown by a simple continuity argument, so we shall omit a proof. Roughly
speaking, if ~ r is close to ~ 1, the aggregate demand function for bond must look very close to
the one for the economy with S = 1, and hence in particular there must be an equilibrium
(q; ~ r). Moreover, if ￿ zh ￿ ￿h ￿ B 6= 0, the continuity implies that Zh (q; ~ r;B) 6= ￿hB where B is the
corresponding equilibrium bond supply, so it must be a sunspot equilibrium (see Remark 3).
The condition ￿ zh ￿ ￿h ￿ B 6= 0 in (2) of Lemma 1 is indispensable. That is, it is possible that
an equilibrium exists for any ￿xed ~ r arbitrarily close to ~ 1, but the equilibrium is not a sunspot
equilibrium, as the following example shows.
Example 4 Assume that the households are identical. Then in any equilibrium, rs = 1 for every
s. In particular, there is no sunspot equilibrium. Indeed, if the households are identical, their
choices must be identical by strict concavity. This means that the consumption cannot be random
since there is no aggregate uncertainty.
This example is e⁄ectively a model of a representative agent, where there can be no trade
for risk sharing purpose. It is nevertheless instructive since it implies that our results in the
following sections will be relying on heterogeneity of households￿characteristics.
But a sunspot equilibrium must exist, generically. As long as there is just a slight heterogene-
ity in the economy (e.g., households have the same preferences but endowed di⁄erently in goods
and pro￿t share), it is intuitively plausible that ￿ zh ￿ ￿h ￿ B = 0 is unlikely to hold in a certainty
8equilibrium. In fact, although we do not elaborate on the details, it can be formally de￿ned
and established that ￿ zh ￿ ￿h ￿ B = 0 is a non generic property as long as H > 1.7 So we contend
that except for non-generic cases such as the case of completely homogeneous agents, a sunspot
equilibrium exists around a non-sunspot equilibrium.
4 Prudence and Over investment
A sunspot equilibrium is ine¢ cient, and there are two sources for ine¢ ciency. The ￿rst is distri-
butional ine¢ ciency: for a given aggregate supply of the good which is independent of sunspots,
households￿consumption is a⁄ected by sunspots. This aspect of ine¢ ciency has been discussed
extensively in the literature of exchange economies, so we do not endeavour to clarify further.
The second is production ine¢ ciency, which we focus in this section: the ￿rm may be pro-
ducing too much or too little. More speci￿cally, starting with a certainty equilibrium where
production is done at an e¢ cient level, we study the level of production in nearby sunspot
equilibria, whose existence has been established in Lemma 1.
Before proceeding to a formal analysis, let us build up some intuition ￿rst. Fix a certainty
equilibrium and ￿x any ~ r close enough to ~ 1 in the sense of Lemma 1. Since the ￿rm￿ s problem
(1) is independent of ~ r, the supply curve of the bond is unchanged, and hence we only need to
examine households￿demand for bond at the sunspot equilibrium. Then the key question will
be how the demand curve shifts; that is, we need to see if the demand for bond gets larger or
smaller under ~ r, other things being equal. If the demand gets larger, then the price of bond must
go up to clear the bond market, i.e., the (average) interest rate will go down, which then should
induce over production. The case of under production can be understood analogously.
The bond is a risky asset in a sunspot equilibrium so at ￿rst sight it might appear that the
risk aversion implies the demand for the bond should decrease. It is well known however that the
risk aversion alone does not determines the sign in a partial equilibrium setting where the level
of income is ￿xed: in fact, it is the magnitude of the relative prudence which plays an important
role.8
Notice there is another general equilibrium e⁄ect through pro￿ts, since the households￿income
depend on the pro￿t level, which is random. Even if the ￿rm￿ s activity does not change so that
the average pro￿t remains the same, ex post pro￿ts will be more random which will make the
second period income more random. Therefore, in principle this is potentially a complex problem
of increasing risks in asset returns as well as background income risk.
On the other hand, risks in returns and pro￿ts are perfectly correlated in equilibrium, and
hence the problem turns out to be manageable to some extent. Note that in equilibrium the
7See Mas-Colell (1985), section 6.
8See Section 4.5 of Gollier (2001), for instance.
9second period income is given by (2): as far as the decision problem in equilibrium is concerned,
the household e⁄ectively take the average pro￿t ￿￿ (q) as given. Moreover, its share of outstand-
ing bond ￿hB is also taken as given, and the household solves a simple investment problem,
controlling the net investment zh ￿ ￿hB whose returns are ~ r.
Now we begin a formal analysis. For expositional simplicity, we shall assume that the utility
functions are additively time separable in this section. The analysis can be done without the sep-
arability: we show the key result Lemma 2 below without separability assumption in Appendix,












for each h. So the utility maximization in equilibrium















h + ￿h (￿￿ (q) + B) + ~ r(zh ￿ ￿hB)
￿￿
: (9)
To describe the corresponding ￿rst order condition (8), set:













h + ￿h (￿￿ (q) + B) + rs (zh ￿ ￿hB)
￿
rs: (10)
Then the ￿rst order condition (8), is now written as Fh (q; ~ r;zh;B) = 0.
Fix a certainty equilibrium (￿ q;1) such that for any ~ r close enough to ~ 1, there is a sunspot
equilibrium (q; ~ r). Let ￿ zh, h = 1;:::;H, and ￿ B be the corresponding bond demand for household
h and bond supply, respectively, in the certainty equilibrium (￿ q;1). To avoid the uninteresting of
zero production, assume that ￿ B > 0. Also let ￿ x0
h and ￿ x1
h be the certainty equilibrium consumption
of household h in period 0 and 1, respectively.
Choose any returns ~ r close enough to ~ 1 so that there is a sunspot equilibrium (q; ~ r). We ￿rst
ask if the demand for bond increase or decrease as returns change from ~ 1 to ~ r, keeping ￿ q and ￿ B
￿xed. That is, we ask how the demand curve shifts around the certainty equilibrium.
First we shall establish some basic results on how individual household￿ s excess demand
Zh changes. We shall calculate changes when returns gets marginally risky. Write ~ r￿S for
￿
r1;:::;rS￿1￿






=￿S to keep the normalization E [~ r] = 1.


















for each h: Then our task is to ￿nd the derivatives of ^ Zh with respect to ~ r￿S, and evaluate them
at ~ r￿S = ~ 1￿S.
From now on, the derivatives of utility functions are evaluated at the certainty equilibrium:






















10for each h. Under our assumptions on the utility function, ￿h > 0. Observe that by symmetry






￿ q;~ 1; ￿ zh; ￿ B
￿



















￿ zh ￿ ￿h ￿ B
￿
(15)
for each h. We have the following result on the ￿rst and the second derivatives of ^ Zh:
Lemma 2 At
￿
￿ q;~ 1; ￿ B
￿
, @










where M is an S ￿ 1 dimensional positive de￿nite matrix determined by probability ￿ (thus
independent of h).
A proof is given in Appendix. Since ￿h > 0, Lemma 2 says that as a function of ~ r￿S,
^ Zh
￿
￿ q; ~ r￿S; ￿ B
￿
is locally minimized at ~ r￿S = ~ 1 if ￿h > 0, and it is locally maximized if ￿h < 0.
Thus if ￿h > 0, then for ~ r￿S close enough to ~ 1, ^ Zh
￿
￿ q; ~ r￿S; ￿ B
￿
> ￿ zh. The demand decreases if
￿h < 0.
It is useful to develop some intuition about Lemma 2 here. The ￿rst order e⁄ect disappears
because of the envelope property. The reason why the second derivative plays a role can be
understood as follows. Since we are interested in increasing risks in the sense of the second order




h + ￿h (￿￿ (￿ q) + B) + r
￿
￿ zh ￿ ￿h ￿ B
￿￿
r is convex,
then by the de￿nition (10) we have Fh
￿
￿ q; ~ r; ￿ zh; ￿ B
￿
> 0. In this case, since Fh is decreasing in
zh, it follows that the demand must increase. It can be readily seen from (15), the parameter ￿h
is nothing but the derivative of this function. Dividing (15) by ￿2u100
h ￿
￿
￿ zh ￿ ￿h ￿ B
￿2
we see that








￿ zh ￿ ￿h ￿ B
: (17)
If household h is absolutely prudent in the sense of u1000
h > 0, the inequality (17) holds if ￿ zh￿￿h ￿ B <
0, that is, household h is a net lender. So these households will increase the demand for the bond
when ~ r gets random. On the other hand, households with ￿ zh ￿ ￿h ￿ B > 0, a net borrower, the
e⁄ect is ambiguous. So condition (17) above can be stringent in some setup.9















￿h > 0, then for any ~ r with E [~ r] = 1 which is close enough to ~ 1, we have
Z
￿
￿ q; ~ r; ￿ B
￿




￿h < 0, for any ~ r with E [~ r] = 1 which is close enough to ~ 1, we have
Z
￿
￿ q; ~ r; ￿ B
￿
< ￿ B.
9Thus the logic behind the over production result is di⁄erent from background risk models. See Section 6.
11Proof. Applying Lemma 2, at
￿
￿ q;~ 1; ￿ B
￿
, @




















￿h > 0, ^ Z
￿
￿ q; ~ r￿S; ￿ B
￿




￿h < 0, ^ Z
￿
￿ q; ~ r￿S; ￿ B
￿
is locally maximized at
~ r￿S = ~ 1￿S. Hence the result follows.





￿h . Assuming absolute prudence, we would like to assert that it tends to be positive.
The reason is as follows: as we have seen in (17), assuming absolute prudence, we have ￿h > 0
for the net lenders. Of course ￿h < 0 is not ruled out for the net borrowers, and this number
could be large enough in absolute value to upset our assertion. But ￿h < 0 occurs for households
whose prudence parameter is low, and/or whose net trade ￿ zh ￿ ￿h ￿ B is very small. Or to say the





in a special but interesting class of models of ￿homogeneous￿economy.
Lemma 4 Assume absolute prudence for the second period utility function, u1000
h > 0 for every
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dent of h, u100
h and u000
h ￿ q2 +u100





￿ zh ￿ ￿h ￿ B
￿
= 0.
Remark 5 The condition in Lemma 4 can be relaxed: the proof only uses the fact that the second
derivatives are common.
Now we are ready to discuss the issue of over/under production. We shall concentrate on two
cases: the case of linear technology and the case of strictly convex technology. The analysis for
hybrid cases can be done analogously.
Let us ￿rst consider the case of linear technology: we assume that f (z) = kz for some constant
k > 0. Under our normalization, and since ￿ B > 0 by assumption, the no pro￿t condition implies
￿ q = k￿1, and of course the zero pro￿t condition ￿￿ (￿ q) = 0 must hold. Now ￿x ~ r close enough to
~ 1 so that a sunspot equilibrium exists. As we mentioned above, the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t maximization
condition is una⁄ected, so the sunspot equilibrium prices must be (￿ q; ~ r).
We have the following result on over/under production in sunspot equilibria.




￿h > 0, then in any sunspot equilibrium
close enough to the certainty equilibrium, the level of production exceeds the e¢ cient level (i.e.,










￿h > 0, and ￿x ~ r close enough to ~ 1. Note that the function Fh in (10) is
decreasing in B, since ~ r > 0 and ￿h
￿~ 1 ￿ ~ r
￿
> 0 in (3). Since Fh is decreasing in zh, this shows
that Zh (￿ q; ~ r;B) is decreasing in B for each h, so is Z (￿ q; ~ r;B). On the other hand, by Lemma
3, we have Z
￿
￿ q; ~ r; ￿ B
￿
> ￿ B. This means that a sunspot equilibrium obtains, i.e., Z (￿ q; ~ r;B) = B





￿h < 0 can be shown analogously.
Next we consider the case of strictly convex technology: we assume that f is a C2 function
with f00 < 0. In this case, the bond supply function is well de￿ned, so denote by B￿ (q) the
supply of bond when the bond price is q. It can be readily established that B￿ (q) is increasing
in q: a higher the bond price means a lower interest rate, so the ￿rm will produce more and
The idea of analysis is essentially the same as before, except that in this case, shifts of demand
function is not enough to identify over or under production, since the excess demand function
may be upward sloping around the certainty equilibrium.




￿ B￿ (q) is de-




￿h > 0, then in any sunspot equilibrium close enough to the certainty









￿h > 0, and ￿x ~ r close enough to ~ 1. By Lemma 3, we have Z
￿
￿ q; ~ r; ￿ B
￿
> ￿ B.





B￿ (q) is decreasing in q at ￿ q, so is Z (q; ~ r;B￿ (q)) ￿ B￿ (q) by continuity, if ~ r is close enough to
~ 1. Therefore, Z (q; ~ r;B￿ (q)) = B￿ (q) implies q > ￿ q and B￿ (q) > B￿ (￿ q) and so the production




￿h < 0 can be shown analogously.




￿ B￿ (q) is increasing in q at ￿ q instead, i.e., the law of demand








￿h < 0 corresponds to over production.




￿h > 0 is prevalent. With this assertion, Proposition 1 and
Proposition 2 roughly indicate that we tend to see over production in a sunspot equilibrium. In




￿h > 0 actually holds. One can construct various parametric
examples, but here we shall give one example of some generality.
Corollary 7 Assume linear technology f (z) = z, and absolute prudence u1000
h > 0 for every h.













Then there is over production in sunspot equilibria.
13Proof. By assumption ￿ q = 1, and so the income of the households must be the same. Thus,






= (￿ e; ￿ e).




￿h > 0, and so there is over
production in any nearby sunspot equilibrium by Proposition 1.
5 The Role of Stock markets
Why do we keep the pro￿t share ￿xed in a standard textbook general equilibrium model? An
answer would be that one could introduce a market for trading shares, but it does not really
matter if markets are already complete: the value of ￿rm is determined by the no arbitrage
condition so that it is equivalent to the bond. Then the share will be a redundant asset in
equilibrium, and the households need not trade the share anyway.
But in our setup, it makes a di⁄erence. If the share can be exchanged competitively in
addition to the bond, it is still the case that the share is redundant in any equilibrium, but
there will be no sunspot equilibrium. Thus the certainty equilibria represent all the equilibria,
essentially. We shall see this result below.
Let qS be the market price of the share. Denote by ^ ￿h the share after trade. Thus the induced






h ￿ qzh ￿ qS
￿
^ ￿h ￿ ￿h
￿
;e1
h + rszh + ^ ￿h￿s
￿
:
A competitive equilibrium can now be de￿ned analogously: (q;qS; ~ r) constitutes an equilibrium
if both the bond market and the stock market clear. An equilibrium is a sunspot equilibrium if
the consumption is random for some households in the second period.10
Clearly, a certainty equilibrium is an equilibrium in this setup: simply set qS = f
￿
￿ q ￿ B
￿￿1
;
and then the bond and the share are equivalent assets, so set ^ ￿h = ￿h for all h. The next non-
existence result is established, by an argument which is roughly the same as that of the standard
￿rst fundamental theorem of welfare economics:11 it is always possible to construct a portfolio
of the stock and the bond whose payo⁄s are independent of sunspots. Using this portfolio, every
household￿ s utility could be improved by avoiding random income. Then such portfolio must be
too expensive for every household, but this is inconsistent with the market clearing conditions.
Proposition 3 If the pro￿t share can be traded in period 0, there is no sunspot equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose there is one, and let q and qS be the bond price and the equity price in
equilibrium, respectively. Let B be the bond issued by the ￿rm in this equilibrium.
10Note that by assumption the ￿rm￿ s behavior is independent of the composition of shareholders.
11The argument is a modi￿cation of the ingenious idea in Mas-Colell (1992). The main di⁄erence is that the
returns of assets are ￿xed exogeneousely in Mas-Colell (1992), whereas they are endogenously determined in this
model.
14Let xs
h be the consumption of household h in state s = 0;1;:::;S in the sunspot equilibrium.











h, i.e., the expected consumption, for every h. Note that from the feasibility of

































h + f (qB); (18)
thus (^ xh)
H


















and the inequality is strict for at least one h
whose consumption is random. Now consider the following portfolio: buy 1 unit of share and B
units of bond: then in state s, the share yields the total pro￿t of the ￿rm ￿￿ (q)+(1￿rs)B, and
the bond pays o⁄ rsB. So the payo⁄ of this portfolio is ￿ := ￿￿ (q)+B, which is independent of
states, and the cost of the portfolio is q￿ := qB +qS. Since ￿ > 0, q￿ > 0 follows by no arbitrage,
so
qB + qS > 0: (19)
So if household h sells the whole ￿h units of the initially owned share and buys 1
￿
￿
￿ xh ￿ e1
h
￿
units of this portfolio, then household h￿ s consumption is exactly ^ xh in every state, which is
more desirable. Therefore, if household h follows this activity in the bond market and the stock
market, household h￿ s consumption in period 0 must not increase, and must decrease if h strictly
prefers ^ x1






^ xh ￿ e1
h
￿
, and the inequality









































the inequality above implies ￿qB > qS, which is a contradiction to the no-arbitrage condition
(19).
156 Remarks
6.1 Welfare Gains and Losses
Consider a certainty equilibrium and a sunspot equilibrium close to it. Although the sunspot
equilibrium must necessarily be ine¢ cient, some households may nevertheless be better o⁄ in
the sunspot equilibrium than in the certainty equilibrium. This point is ￿rst raised by Goenka
- PrØchac (2006) in a simple symmetric pure exchange setting, and then it is elaborated in a
general exchange economy setup by Kajii (2007). These papers however do not take production
into account. Here we shall discuss how the question of welfare gains and losses can be addressed
in the model with production.
There are three e⁄ects which determines the economic welfare in a sunspot equilibrium,
relative to the certainty equilibrium. First, sunspots make the returns of asset more random,
which is bad for all households since they loose a perfect saving device.
Secondly, the equilibrium bond price is di⁄erent from the e¢ cient one. As we have argued, the
equilibrium bond price tends to be higher in the non-linear technology case, making the expected
real interest rate lower in sunspot equilibria. This is bad news for those who save. Consider a
typical setup where households are endowed with good in period 0 only, so all the households
save in equilibrium. Then this second e⁄ect is also bad for all the households.
The third e⁄ect is more delicate. A lower real interest rate is good news for the ￿rm, and the
￿rm tends to be more pro￿table in the sunspot equilibrium. The additional pro￿ts are distributed
to the shareholders, so this is welfare improving. Especially for those households with relatively
large share, the positive welfare e⁄ect from this channel can be large enough to o⁄set the ￿rst
two negative e⁄ects.
To sum up the discussion, we conclude that: (1) a household whose share ￿h is zero must
be worse o⁄ in the sunspot equilibrium. (2) if the technology exhibits constant returns to scale,
then all the households must be worse o⁄ in the sunspot equilibrium because expected pro￿t is
always zero. A formal analysis including other cases appears to be a very interesting research
agenda.
6.2 Comparison with background income risk models
The sunspot model we developed in this paper has some ￿ avor of the so called background income
risk model. More speci￿cally, imagine that the second period endowments gets slightly riskier,
thus states are no longer sunspots, and the real return of the bond is ￿xed at one. Then by the
precautionary saving argument, the saving of each household will increase assuming that u
1000
h > 0
for every household. Therefore, the price of bond must go up and the level of production also
goes up, and so this background risk model also explains a higher level of production.
16However, a higher level of production in this model does not mean that there is over pro-
duction. Notice that since the background risks cannot be insured, one cannot hope for full
e¢ ciency to begin with. And more importantly, one cannot necessarily say that the higher level
of production under background risk is excessive, since there is no benchmark e¢ cient level of
production within the model. In our sunspot model, the certainty equilibrium is a benchmark
for comparison, and the meaning of over/under production is very clear.
In the background risk model, a relevant exercise close to ours is to check the constrained
e¢ ciency of the equilibrium.12 For instance, suppose the government can control the level of input
and output by some criterion di⁄erent from pro￿t maximization, letting all the other variables
be endogenously determined in the markets. Should the government ￿nd reducing the level of
output bene￿cial to the economy, one can then argue that there is over production.13
6.3 Extensions
To conclude, let us provide a few remarks concerning the single good assumption in our analysis.
If there are multiple consumption goods, the set of sunspot equilibria is still parametrized by ~ r,
and we believe that the existence of sunspot equilibria can be established analogously. A poten-
tial complication arises due to changes in equilibrium relative prices of goods within each spot
markets. This will make the analysis potentially involved, but it appears to us that the nature
of the analysis will not change as far as the existence is concerned.14 The issue of under/over
production will become less clear cut, obviously. Nevertheless, we believe that analogous exercise
can be done to see if the real interest rate goes down or not due to sunspots.
In the case of multiple goods, it is natural to think of many ￿rms as well. In the standard
complete markets setup, one could regard these ￿rms as one ￿rm which does a joint production
because of the equivalence of individual ￿rms￿pro￿t maximization and pro￿t maximization of
the aggregated ￿rm. Then even in the sunspot set up, as long as we assume expected pro￿t
maximization, the same argument would work. However, for the non-existence result (Proposition
3), such aggregation is not neutral. If each consumption good is produced by one ￿rm, and if
all the ￿rms￿shares are traded in their respective markets, then the non-existence result will still
hold. Then, it means that the aggregation of production side does not work as in the complete
markets. There seems to be many interesting directions for further research.
12Various sorts of constrained e¢ ciency excercises are possible in the incomplete market models. See Citanna,
Kajii, and Villanacci (1998) for a general treatment and an overview of the literatrue.
13Davila et al (2007) considered a model of background individual uninsurable risks with no aggregate risk and
asked if a competitive equilibrium is constrained e¢ cient. They found that over production tends to occur if the
households are relatively homogeneous.
14See Gottardi and Kajii (1999) for the case of pure exchange.
17Appendix A Proof of Lemma 2
We shall give a proof without time additive separability assumption. The reader then will see
that the other results reported in the main text can readily be shown without the separability
assumption.
Fix a certainty equilibrium (￿ q;1) and denote by ￿ B and ￿ zh, h = 1;:::;H, the bond supply and
the demand in the equilibrium, respectively. For each h, let










where derivatives are evaluated at (e0
h ￿ ￿ qzh;
￿
e1
h + ￿h (￿￿ (q) + B) + rs (zh ￿ ￿hB)
￿S
s=1). That
is, Fh (q; ~ r;zh;B) = 0 is the ￿rst order condition for utility maximization. Thus by construction,
Fh
￿
￿ q;~ 1; ￿ zh; ￿ B
￿
= 0 for every h. Note also that by the additive separability and the symmetry





















where the derivatives are evaluated at
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Under our maintained assumptions on the utility function, the change in the modi￿ed de-
mand ^ Zh
￿
￿ q;￿; ￿ B
￿






First, we shall show that @
@rs ^ Zh = 0 at ~ r￿S = ~ 1￿S. Indeed, evaluated at ~ r￿S = ~ 1￿S and










for each s = 1;:::;S ￿1, and @
@zh￿h = @
@zhFh.




















@rs ^ Zh = 0, for each s = 1;:::;S ￿ 1. The symmetry relation (20)
then implies that this equation is reduced to @
@zhFh
@
@rs ^ Zh = 0, so @
@rs ^ Zh = 0 must hold for each
s = 1;:::;S ￿ 1, since @
@zhFh is not zero.
Next, we calculate the second order e⁄ect, @
2
@rs@rs0 ^ Zh. Set ￿h := ￿ @
@zhFh (= ￿ @
@zh￿h), and set
￿h to be the common constant in (22), so @
2







￿h M; where M is an S ￿ 1 dimensional positive de￿nite matrix determined
by probability ￿ (thus in particular independent of h).




@rs ^ Zh = 0 with respect to rs
0
, and evaluate the
result at ~ r￿S = ~ 1￿S and zh = ￿ zh. Both @
@rs￿h and @
@zh￿h are functions of zh, but since @
@rs ^ Zh =











@rs@rs0 ^ Zh = 0: (23)
So solving (23) we have @
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@rs@rs0 ￿h. Now by con-
struction, @
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; where the last equality holds
by (21) and @
2
@(rS)2Fh = ￿S￿h. Thus if s 6= s0, @
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￿S by (21). For s = s0,
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￿1 0 ￿￿￿ 0
0 ￿2 . . .
. . .
... 0
































The two matrices consisting of (￿1;:::;￿S) in (24) are both positive de￿nite, and they are deter-
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